


























HIGH SEAS PROBLEM SITUATIONS 
A. PROBLEM I: Right to Board and Inspect a Foreign Vessel on 
the High Seas Thought To Be Guilty of Damaging Transatlantic 
Cables 
The facts and several of the issues of this problem-an actual 
case-are set forth in an exchange of notes between the United States 
and the Soviet Union during February and March, 1959. (See 
below.) In reading this exchange of notes it will be well to keep 
in mind certain pertinent provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas,t which had been signed by both the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. prior to the incident.2 
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas enumerates, among 
others, the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines. The article 
also includes a corollary duty in providing that this freedom (as well 
as the others which are enumerated and additional ones required by 
international law) "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable 
regard to the interests of other States in their excercise of the free-
dom of the high seas." 3 The essence of this provision is that each 
user of the high seas must accommodate every other user in order to 
have the least possible interference among all users commensurate 
with the maximum utilization o£ the high seas. 
Hence, the article provides for certain enumerated rights (i.e., 
"freedoms") on the high seas, both for coastal and non-coastal states, 
and at the same time expresses a general duty or obligation of each 
state which exercises those rights to be reasonable in doing so. 
Reasonableness in the context of the problem situation here, involving 
damage to five submarine cables by a trawler, means that in exercising 
its right to fish in the high seas, the fishing vessel must not wilfully or 
negligently damage the cables. This is the minimum standard of 
duty to which the trawler may be held, and it should be noted that 
Article II of the 1884 Convention For the Protection of Submarine 
1 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958). 
2 See Appendix J, p. 264. Although both states have signed the Convention 
on the High Seas, neither had ratified it at the time of the incident. 
3 See Appendix B for a complete text of the Cgnvention on the High Seas. 
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Cables 4 to which both the United States and the U.S.SR. are parties, 
expressly establishes this duty by making a wilful or culpably negli-
gent damage to the submarine cable a punishable offense. 5 
Articles 26 to 29, inclusive, of the Convention on the High Seas also 
contain provisions relating to submarine cables which should be kept 
in mind in analyzing the exchange of notes between the United States 
and the Soviet Government: 
"ARTICLE 26 
"1. All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and 
pipelines on the bed of the high seas. 
"2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the 
exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its 
natural resources, the coastal State may not impede the laying 
or maintenance of such cables or pipelines. 
"3. When laying such cables or pipelines the State in ques-
tion shall pay due regard to cables or pipelines already in 
position on the seabed. In particular, possibilities of repair-
ing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced. 
"ARTICLE 27 
"Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures 
to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its 
flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine 
cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through culpable 
negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or 
obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and sim-
ilarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-
voltage power cable shall be a punishable offence. This 
provision shall not apply to any break or injury caused by 
persons who acted merely with the legitimate object of saving 
their lives or their ships, after having taken all necessary 
precautions to avoid such break or injury. 
"ARTICLE 28 
"Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures 
to provide that, if persons subject to its jurisdiction who are 
the owners of a cable or pipeline beneath the high seas, in 
laying or repairing that cable or pipeline, cause a break in or 
injury to another cable or pipeline, they shall bear the cost 
of the repairs. 
'24 Stat. 989, 25 Stat. 142'!. For the text of the pertinent sections of the 
Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables (1884), see infra, p. 165. 
5 Ibid., at Art. II. 
"ARTICLE 29 
"Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures 
to ensure that the owners of ships who can prove that they 
have sacrificed an anchor, a net or any other fishing gear, in 
order to avoid injuring a submarine cable or pipeline, shall 
be inden1nified by the owner of the cable or pipeline, pro-
vided that the owner of the ship has taken all reasonable 
precautionary measures beforehand." 
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EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND 
SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON DAMAGE TO SUBMARINE 
CABLES FROM FEBRUARY 21 TO 25, 1959 6 
U.S. Aide Memoire of February 28, 1959 
The Embassy of the United States of America has been instructed 
to inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics of the following : 
Between February 21-25, 1959, four telegraph and one voice trans-
atlantic cables were damaged and put out of service. Aerial in-
vestigation disclosed that the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI{ No. 
RT -99 was in the area of these cable difficulties. 
In accordance with the "Convention for Protection of Submarine 
Cables" of 1884, to which the Soviet Union and the United States are 
parties, a U.S. naval vessel put a visiting party on board the 
NOVOROSSIISK on February 26 to investigate v1hether the trawler 
had violated the Convention. 
After discussion with the Trawler Captain and examination of the 
log, the boarding officer from the U.S.S. R. 0. HALE made an 
appropriate entry in the journal of the trawler as required by Article 
X of the Convention and the visiting party left the vessel. The 
tra,vler's log indicated that the ship had been in the area o£ cable 
damage at the time of the last service interruption. It is understood 
that the trawler proceeded on its way without delay. 
A cable repair ship is en route to the area of cabJe damage for final 
investigation and repair. 
Soviet Note of March 4, 1959 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to the aide memoire of the 
United States Embassy of February 28 concerning the detention and 
inspection of the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK on February 26 
by an American vessel and considers it necessary to declare the 
following: 
6 State Dept. Bull. Vol. XL No.1034, pp. 555-558, (April20, 1959). 
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According to information available to competent Soviet 
organs, the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK was engaged 
in fishing in the open sea in the Northern Atlantic Ocean and 
caused no damage of any kind to the underwater telegraph 
or telephone Trans-Atlantic cables. Reports concerning this 
question appearing in the American press are figments of 
the imagination. 
Consequently, the American naval vessel R. 0. HALE had 
no reason for detaining and inspecting the aforementioned 
Soviet trawler. Attention must be called to the :fact that 
these actions of the American authorities were undertaken 
specifically ·with respect to a Soviet vessel at a time in the 
region of Newfoundland when there were hundreds of ves-
sels from other countries engaged in fishing and, as reported, 
many of which have more than once damaged Trans-
Atlantic cables. 
The Soviet Government cannot ignore the fact that in 
connection "\vith the above-indicated actions of the United 
States authorities numerous reports have appeared in the 
American press containing various anti-Soviet :fabrications 
concerning the purpose of the presence of a Soviet fishing 
vessel in this region. These articles in the American press 
are of such a kind that the impression is unavoidable that all 
this venture with the detention of the Soviet trawler was 
undertaken with provocative purposes. Not the least among 
these purposes is an attempt to strain Soviet-American rela-
tions. It is impossible in this connection not to draw atten-
tion to the responsibility which the American Government 
takes upon itself by taking such steps. 
The Soviet Govern1nent protests against the detention and 
inspection of the Soviet fishing trawler NOVOROSSIISK 
by the American naval vessel and anticipates that the Gov-
ernment of the United States will take all necessary measures 
to prevent further such completely unjustified actions with 
respect to Soviet fishing vessels engaged in the fishing trade 
in waters of the open sea. 
U.S. Note of March 23, 1959 
The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Min-
istry's note No. 17 /OSA, dated March 4, 1959 concerning recent breaks 
in certain transatlantic submarine tele-communication cables and the 
consequent visit to the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI( by a board-
ing party of the U.S.S. ROY 0. HALE, which was the subject of 
the Embassy's aide memoire of February 28, 1959. 
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The Ministry's note states in substance that the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( 1) in accordance with informa-
tion available to it denies that the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI{ 
'vas responsible for the reported breaks in the transatlantic sub-
marine cables; (2) that in its opinion the United States naval vessel 
U.S.S. ROY 0. HALE had no reason to detain and inspect the 
Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK; and (3) that based on articles 
which have appeared in the American press concerning the purpose 
of the presence of a Soviet fishing vessel in this region the de ten-
tion of the Soviet trawler was undertaken with "provocative pur-
poses." The note concludes that "The Soviet Government protests 
against the detention and inspection of the Soviet fishing trawler 
NOVOROSSIISK by the American naval vessel and anticipates 
that the Government of the United States will take all necessary 
measures to prevent :further such completely unjustified actions with 
respect to Soviet fishing vessels engaged in the fishing trade in waters 
of the open sea . " 
For the reasons set out hereinafter the United States Government 
considers there is no basis for a protest in this case and the Soviet 
protest is therefore rejected. Furthermore, the United States Gov-
ernment is surprised that the Soviet Government should make a 
charge that the detention of the Soviet trawler was for "provocative 
purposes" with no other basis than apparent irritation at articles in 
American newspapers speculating on the purposes of Soviet trawlers 
in certain waters. As the Soviet Government well knows, the Amer-
ican press is free within legal limits to publish its opinions and these 
do not engage the responsibility of the Government. Charges based 
on such flimsy support are not themselves calculated to further 
friendly relations. 
The facts of the matter are as follows.· 
During the period February 21 through February 25, 1959, com-
munications were disrupted by damage to five transatlantic cables in 
the Newfoundland area located within a rectangle bounded by the 
following coordinates: 
latitude 49°24' N., longitude 50°12' W.; 
latitude 49°32' N., longitude 49°48' ,V.; 
latitude 50°13' N., longitude 51 °00' W.; 
latitude 50°22' N., longitude 50°36' W. 
The first break occurred on February 21, 1959, at 10 :43 a.m., east-
ern standard time, in the transatlantic cable owned and operated in 
part jointly with a Canadian company by the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company, a United States corporation having its 
head office at New York, New York. The cable has its west terminus 
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in Newfoundland and the east terminus in Scotland, and it ultimately 
connected with the United States of America by submarine cable and 
radio relay. 
The second break occurred on February 24, 1959, at 2 :20 p.m., 
eastern standard time, in the transatlantic cable 1-VA, connecting 
Newfoundland and Ireland. The third break occurred on February 25 
at 2 :50 a.m., eastern standard time, in the transatlantic cable 3-PZ 
connecting Newfoundland and England. The fourth cable break 
occurred on February 25 at 11 :20 a.m., eastern standard time, in 
cable 2-VA connecting Newfoundland with Ireland. The fifth break 
occurred on February 25 at 4 :20 p.m., eastern standard time, in the 
transatlantic cable 4-PZ connecting Newfoundland and England. 
These four submarine cables connect ultimately with the United 
States, and are owned and operated by the Western Union Telegraph 
Company, a United States corporation with its head office at New 
York, New York. 
Subsequent examination showed that there were a total of twelve 
breaks in the five cables. Nine of these were tension breaks and three 
were man-made cuts severing the cables. 
Aerial observation conducted by the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company sighted the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK 
RT-99 on the morning of February 25, 1959, in the approximate 
position latitude 49°34' N. and longitude 50°00' W., steaming on a 
southerly course at a speed of about three knots. No other vessels 
were visible at the time in the immediate vicinity. The aircraft suc-
ceeded in dropping a note on the deck of the trawler NOVOROS-
SIISK advising that it cease trawling in the area. 
The Government of the United States, acting under the provisions 
of Article X of the Convention for the Protection of Submarine Ca-
bles, of 1884, to which both the United States and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics adhere, and also in conformity with United 
States law ( 47 United States Code, Section 26), implementing the 
convention, on February 25, 1959, dispatched the United States radar 
picket escort U.S.S. ROY 0. HALE to the area to investigate the re-
ported breaks in the submarine cables. On February 26, 1959, about 
11 :55 a.m., eastern standard time, the Commander of the U.S.S. ROY 
0. HALE sent a party consisting of one officer and four enlisted men, 
without arms, aboard the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISI(. At the 
time of the visit the trawler was in position latitude 48°26' N., longi-
tude 49°10' W. There were no other ships in the inunediate vicinity. 
The last four cable breaks referred to above were all located within 
14 miles of each other and were each \vithin a 12-mile radius of the 
observed position of the trawler NOVOROSSIISK on February 25, 
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1959, with the nearest two breaks no more than five miles distant. 
The five reported cable breaks all occurred within a radius of 52 miles 
of one another. (All references are to nautical miles.) A line join-
ing- the last four reported positions of the breaks is a straight line with 
the breaks occurring in succession in the direction of approximately 
160° T. A vessel in that vicinity trawling in a general southerly di-
rection during the period in question would have been in the locations 
necessary to cause the breaks. 
The boarding officer, communicating by means of French throug-h 
an interpreter, duly informed and explained to the master of the traw-
ler NOVOROSSIISK the purpose of his visit and his authority to do 
so under the provisions of the convention of 1884. He examined, with 
the consent and acquiescence of the master, the papers of the trawler 
which appeared to be in order. 
The boarding officer found that the latitude and longitude which the 
trawler NOVOROSSIISK recorded in her journal for the previous 
days' positions also showed her to have been in the immediate vicinity 
of all five cable breaks. Upon request, the master produced the mes-
sage dropped on the deck of the trawler on the previous day from 
the aircraft of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the boarding officer concluded 
that an examination of the fishing gear and equipment was justified 
to determine whether the trawler was capable of causing the cable 
breaks. 
The unarmed boarding officer, with the consent of the master of the 
trawler, observed without deep examination, on the upper deck of the 
trawler only, the trawling equipment and fishing gear. The board-
ing officer noted that the trawling equipment was of the type for deep 
sea fishing, and was in general fairly new, with the exception of the 
otter boards and net discs which were well worn and in poor condition. 
The trawling cable was estimated to be a bout 300 fathoms in length, 
sufficiently long enough to drag the gear on the bottom at the depth in 
the area-about 180 fathoms. Two broken sections of trawling cable 
each about 60 feet in length were observed wrapped around the hatch 
on deck. The four ends of these cables were shredded and frayed and 
appeared to have parted as a result of a sudden strain such as could 
have been caused by snagging the gear. These sections are identical 
in type, age, and condition with the trawling cable. Some of the fish 
observed lying frozen on deck were of the bottom type. 
The visit on board the trawler lasted about 70 minutes, and was 
completed at 1 :05 p.m., eastern standard time. At the time of his de-
parture the boarding officer made the following entry in the trawler's 
journal: 
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1355-The NOVOROSSIISK (RT-99) motor vessel this date 
has been visited by me at Longitude 49°10' vV., Latitude 48°26' 
N., and at 1355 (time+3) 26 February 1959. I have examined 
the ship papers and :found them to appear regular, but the pres-
ence of a message drop regarding cut "submarine" cables signed 
by Capt. R. Cooper, A/C OF-CPR indicated further investiga-
tion of fishing equipment required. All papers sighted bear my 
signature. The Captain consented to such further inspection but 
appeared dubious of the number of men to inspeci. 
1440-Completed Inspection and departed. 
/s/ D. M. SHEELY 
Lt., U.S. Navy 
/s/ D. M. SHEELY 
LT., U.S. Navy 
A preliminary report emanating from the cable repair ship LORD 
KELVIN which has since repaired the first broken cable states that 
the eastern portion of the damaged cable had been badly scraped 
and scuffed for about a mile east of the break. The cable had been 
severed by cutting. The technical opinion is that such evidence indi-
cates that a trawler had picked up the cable with its drag, then having 
pulled it on deck, had cut it to release the nets. 
The protection of submarine telecommunications cables on the high 
seas constitutes an international obligation. The locations and pres-
ence of the transatlantic submarine cables that have been cut are 
widely known among world fishing and maritime circles. They are 
shown and marked on United States admiralty and navigation maps 
which are available to the general public. 
The above-stated record of events shows that, contrary to the as-
sertions and charges made in the above-mentioned note of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the visit to the Soviet trawler NOVOROS-
SIISI{ under the circumstances shown was entirely justified and was 
in every respect in accordance with international law and applicable 
treaty provisions. 
The Government of the United States is satisfied that the evidence 
in its possession raises a stJ'ong presumption that the master and crew 
of the Soviet trawler NOVOROSSIISK have violated Article II of 
the convention of 1884 above-mentioned which provides that "the 
breaking or injury of a submarine cable, done wilfully or through 
culpable negligence, and resulting in the total or partial interruption" 
of telegraphic communication shall be a punishable offense. 
Article VIII et seq. of the convention place the responsibility for 
the repression of these violations of the convention and trial and 
punishment of the violators on the Soviet Union. Therefore, the 
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Government of the United States calls upon the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socia1ist Republics to discharge its international ob-
ligations as summarily as its laws and regulations will permit, by 
promptly making such investigations and taking such measures as 
are necessary to punish those who may be found to be guilty. 
The Government of the United States reserves the right to make 
such claims for damages as may be found to be warranted. 
The Government of the United States further expeets that the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will take 
effective measures to prevent Soviet fishing trawlers on the high 
seas from damaging or cutting submarine cables in the future. 
The Government of the United States further states that it will 
continue to fulfill its international obligations with regard to the pro-
tection of submarine cables. 
CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF SUBMARINE CABLES 
(1884) 
ARTICLE I 
The present Convention shall be applicable, outside of the territorial 
waters, to all legally established submarine cables landed in the ter-
ritories, colonies or possessions of one or more of the High Contract-
ing Parties. 
ARTICLE II 
The breaking or injury of a submarine cable, done wilfully or 
through culpable negligence, and resulting in the total or partial 
interruption or embarrassment of telegraphic communications, shall 
be a punishable offense, but the punishment inflicted shall be no bar 
to a civil action for damages. 
This provision shall not apply to ruptures or injuries when the 
parties guilty thereof have become so simply with legitimate object 
of saving their lives or their vessels, after having taken all necessary 
precautions to avoid such ruptures or injuries. 
* * * 
ARTICLE VIII _ 
The courts competent to take cognizance of infraction of this con-
vention shall be those of the country to which the vessel on board of 
which the infraction has been committed belongs. 
It is, moreover, understood that, in cases in which the provision 
contained in the foregoing paragraph cannot be carried out, the 
repression of violations of this convention_ shall take place, in each 
of the contracting States, in the case of its subjects or citizens, in 
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accordance with the general rules of penal competence established by 
the special laws of those States, or by international treaties. 
* * * 
ARTICLE X 
Evidence of violations of this convention may be obtained by all 
methods of securing proof that are allowed by tl1e laws of the country 
of the court before which a case has been brought. 
When the officers commanding the vessels of war or the vessels 
specially commissioned for that purpose, of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties, shall have reason to believe that an infraction of 
the measures provided for by this Convention has been committed 
by a vessel other than a vessel of war, they may require the captain 
or master to exhibit the official documents furnishing evidence of the 
nationality of the said vessel. Summary mention of such exhibition 
shall at once be made on the documents exhibited. 
Reports may, moreover, be prepared by the said officers, whatever 
may be the nationality of the inculpated vessel. These reports shall 
be drawn up in the form and in the language in use in the country 
to which the officer drawing them up belongs; they may be used as 
evidence in the country in which they shall be invoked, and according 
to the laws of such country. The accused parties and the witnesses 
shall have the right to add or to cause to be added thereto, in their 
own language any explanations that they may deem proper; these 
declarations shall be duly signed. 
ARTICLE XI 
Proceedings and trial in cases of infractions of the provisions of 
this Convention shall always take place as summarily as the laws and 
regulations in force will permit. 
ARTICLE XII 
The High Contracting Parties engage to take or to propose to their 
respective legislative bodies the measures necessary in order to secure 
the execution of this Convention, and especially in order to cause the 
punishment, either by fine or imprisonment, or both, of such persons 
as may violate the provisions of articles II, V and VI. 
The international law questions involved in this problem are as 
follow: 7 
7 In analyzing this problem the following references will be helpful, IV 
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 243-24 7 ( 1940-44) ; Higgins and Co-
lombos, International Law of the Sea 38, 262-264, 298-302; (2nd Rev. ed. 1950). 
I Hyde, International Law Ohiefty as Interpreted and Applied by the United 
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1. Does a state with either publicly or privately owned submarine 
cables have the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel on the high 
seas when that vessel is thought to be guilty of damaging the cables 
either by intentional or culpably negligent action~ 
2. If a state has the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel 
under the above circumstances, does the right exist : 
(a) Because both states are parties to the Convention for the 
Protection of Submarine. Cables ( 1884) ; or 
(h) Because customary international law has developed from the 
1884 Convention and/ or from general state practice so that the right 
of the aggrieved state (and the corollary duty of the injuring state) 
"\vould exist even though one (or both) of the states was not a party 
to the 1884 Convention; or 
(c) Because the states are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas~ 
Subsidiary questions will be discussed in connection with the basic 
questions above, such as: 
1. May a convention be interpreted in such manner as to accord 
the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel on the high seas when 
provisions of the convention do not expressly grant this right~ 
2. Does the 1884 Convention, customary international law, or the 
1958 Geneva c·onvention give the right to an injured state to board 
a foreign war vessel, a foreign merchant or fishing vessel which is 
publicly owned; or only a foreign merchant or fishing vessel which 
is privately owned~ 
3. Is the Soviet Government bound by the provisions of the 1884 
Convention which were signed by Czarist Russia, a predecessor 
government ~ 
Q. I. Does a state with either publicly or privately owned sub-
marine cables have the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel 
on the high seas when that vessel is thought to be guilty of damaging 
the cables either by intentional or culpably negligent action~ 
International law, no less than other law, comes into existence to 
permit the world community of states to achieve certain values, among 
"\V hich is the protection against wrongful destruction of devices of 
communication owned by a state or the citizens thereof. Principles 
are formulated and rules promulgated unilaterally by states and 
accepted, modified, or rejected by other states with the result that 
eventually a body of commonly accepted principles and rules of cus-
State8 1-20, 693-695, 751-753, (1945) ; I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International 
Law, 587-626 (8th ed. 1957) ; II Malloy, Treatie~, Convention8, International 
Act8, Protocol8 and Agreement8 Between the United State8 and Other Power8, 
1776-1909, 1949"-1957 (1910 ed). 
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tomary international law develop. In other instances, these estab-
lished principles and rules, or totally new ones, are embodied in con-
ventions signed and ratified by a number of states which are bound 
thereby. If the conventions codify customary international law 
then the principles and rules are binding upon all states, whether 
signatory to the convention or not. 
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which the delegates from 
86 states at the Geneva Conference (or at least the delegates from 
the 65 states voting for the Convention) 8 agreed was ·codifying the 
rules of international law relating to the high seas, provides in Arti-
cle 2 for a number o£ freedoms, including both "freedom of fishing" 
and "freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines." 9 
The first question therefore may be rephrased as follows: If a state 
(Soviet Union) in the exercise of her acknowledged right to fish 
on the high seas interferes with and causes damage to the property 
of nationals of another state (United States) in the exercise of her 
equally valid right to hiy, operate and maintain submarine cables, 
which right, if either, shall prevail over the other and what duties 
does each state owe to the other to safeguard the other's interests and 
0 h ~ rig ts. 
In this problem situation both the United States and the Soviet 
Union are inclusive users of a common resource-the high seas. 
But generally speaking, a right to the free use of the high seas is 
not absolute in the sense that other users may be disregarded, en-
dangered, impeded or excluded. Indeed, the 1958 Convention on the 
High Seas specifically provides that the freedoms enumerated, and 
others which are recognized by the general princi pies of interna-
tional law, "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard 
to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the 
high seas." 10 (emphasis added) 
Therefore, although a Soviet trawler may fish in the high seas, it 
may not do so in a manner which endangers or interferes unreason-
ably with the right of the United States to operate and maintain 
her sub1narine cables. Later we shall note and discuss certain specific 
provisions of both the 1884 Convention and the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention in relation to rights of the cable state and the corollary duties 
of the fishing state. 
First, let us review briefly the history of submarine cables in rela,-
tion to the problem at hand. When the first submarine cables were 
laid in 1851 it was only natural that states became concerned with 
8 2 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/38, 61 (1958)). 
9 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53 and corr. 1, Art. 2 (2)-(3), (1958). 
10 Ibid., at Art. 2, par. 2. 
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the need for their protection. One theory advanced as a possible basis 
for such protection was that the doctrine of piracy, which permitted 
search and seizure of offending persons and vessels, could be extended 
to instances of willful damage to cables. A convention was proposed 
which would have embodied this concept, but it did not materialize. 
Later, an international agreement was recommended and after pro-
tracted discussions, including rejection of the assimilation of the 
piracy doctrine to the destruction of cables, an international confer-
ence resulted in the Paris Convention of 1884. The United States and 
the Soviet Union are parties to this Convention. 
Although the right to board and inspect a foreign vessel on the 
high seas is not specifically provided for in the 1884 Convention, the 
provisions of Article X of the Convention clearly contemplate such 
action. Article X provides in part, 
"Evidence of violations of this convention may be obtained 
by all methods of securing proof that are allowed by the laws 
of the country of the court before which a case has been 
brought." 11 
Hence an injured state may use reasonable ~ means to secure evi-
dence of damages to its cables. Reasonable means would, of necessity, 
include the right to board and inspect the suspected vessel because in 
many instances it would not be possible to make a reasonably con-
clusive determination of the cause of the damage without such board-
ing and inspection. 
The facts at hand prior to the boarding of the Soviet vessel reason-
ably supported the presumption that the breaks in the cables had 
resulted from the trawling activities since no other vessels were ob-
served in the area at the times of the breaks. There was also good 
reason to believe that the breaks had been caused either by wilful or 
culpably negligent action since one of the breaks occurred in the late 
afternoon of February 25, 1959, after the aircraft had succeeded in 
dropping a note on the deck of the trawler advising it to cease trawl-
ing in the area. 
After the boarding, the information obtained by inspection of the 
trawler's log, as well as the production by .the master of the air-
dropped message and denial of responsibility, by the master, made 
further inspection by the boarding party both reasonable and neces-
sary. The n1odest inspection of the trawler's upper decks and trawl-
ing gear without deep examination of the trawler, which revealed that 
of the twelve breaks in the five cables three were man-made cuts 
severing the cables, confirmed the suspicions of the United States 
boarding party. 
11 For the complete text see supra, p. 166. 
607631---61----12 
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Article X of the 1884 Convention also provides that 
"When the officers (of the injured state) . . . shall have rea-
son to believe that an infraction of the measures provided 
for by this Convention has been committed by a vessel other 
than a vessel of war, they may require the captain or master 
to ewhibit the official documents furnishing evidence of the 
nationality of the said vessel." 12 (emphasis added) 
Here again the language of the 1884 Convention clearly implies the 
right to board the suspected vessel because there is no other way to 
require the captain or master to exhibit the official documents :furnish-
ing the evidence o:f the nationality o:f the vessel, other than requesting 
the captain to leave his ship and go aboard the inspecting ship. Noth-
ing in the Convention or in internationalla w would permit the inspect-
ing ship to make such a request under the circumstances o:f the case. 
Thus, a visit by a boarding party o:f the inspecting ship to the trawler 
would be the only way to exercise the right granted to the inspecting 
ship under Article X. It should also be noted that Article X requires 
the boarding officer to make "summary mention o:f such exhibition . . . 
at once ... on the documents exhibited," 13 an action which in most 
instances could only take place with the documents at hand and on 
board the suspected vessel. 
Thus, it 1nay be concluded that under the 1884 Convention :for the 
Protection o:f Submarine Cables, the United States had a right to 
board and inspect the Soviet tra wier in the manner in which it was 
done, the boarding party having conformed to all requirements o:f the 
Convention. 
Q. 2. I:£ a state has the right to board and inspect a :foreign vessel 
on the high seas when that vessel is thought to be guilty o:f damaging 
the cables either by intentional or culpably negligent action, does the 
right exist, 
(a) Because both states are parties to the Convention :for the 
Protection o:f Submarine Cables ( 1884) ; or 
(b) Because customary internationalla w has developed from the 
1884 Convention and/ or :from general state practice so that the right 
o:f the aggrieved state (and the corollary duty o:f the injuring state) 
would exist even though one (or both) o:f the states was not a party to 
the 1884 Convention; or 
(c) Because the states are parties to the 1958 Geneva Convention 




As indicated in the discussion of Question # 1, the right of a state 
to board and inspect a vessel on the high seas is clearly implied by 
Article X of the 1884 Convention. Since both the United States and 
the Soviet Union are parties to that Convention they are accorded the 
rights and are subjected to the obligations thereof. 
Of course, it might be argued that the present Soviet Government 
is a successor government to Czarist Russia which signed the 1884 
Convention and is therefore not bound by the Convention. However, 
this line of argument is without foundation for three reasons: First, 
the general rule in international law is that a change in the form of 
government of a state, or a change from one ruler or one administra-
t ion to another, does not terminate or modify its treaties.14 Lauter-
pacht-Oppenheim have written, 
"As treaties are binding upon the contracting States changes 
in the Government, or even in the form of government, of one 
of the parties can, as a rule, have no influence whatever upon 
the binding force of treaties." 15 
Second, in the present instance the Soviet Government failed to 
deny the applicability of the 1884 Convention, after the United States 
had invoked it in the Aide Memoire of February 28, 1959 and in the 
Note of March 23, 1959, as the basis for the claim of rights against 
the Soviet Government. The United States referred in the Aide 
Memoire to the 1884 Convention, "to which the Soviet Union and the 
United States are parties." 16 In the March 23 note the United States 
alluded to the 1884 Convention, "to which both the United States 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhere." 17 It seems 
logical to assume that if the Soviet Union had not felt bound by the 
1884 Convention she would have said so and dropped the matter there 
14 Bishop, International Law 166 (1953); 5 Hackworth, International Law 
360 (1940-1944); Harvard Research in International Law, Treaties, 29 A.J.I.L. 
Supp. 1044 (1935). "Unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, the obliga-
tions of a State under a treaty are not affected by any change in its government 
organization or its constitutional system." (Ibid., at Art. 24.). 
Since the Soviet Government is charged here as the injuring state, it is im-
portant to note that at times that state has asserted' its freedom from certain 
treaties concluded by prior Russian Governments, but appears to recognize the 
continuing validity as to the Soviet Union of other pre-Soviet Russian treaties. 
See Harvard Research, op. cit., 1052-54; Hazard, "The Soviet Union and Inter-
national Law," 43 Illinois Law Review 591,594 (1948). 
15 I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Law 925 (8th ed. 1957). 
16 See text supra, Ch. V, p. 165. 
17 Ibid. 
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instead of claiming variously (a) that the Soviet trawler did not 
damage the cables, (b) there was no way of telling whether the Soviet 
tra -vv ler damaged the cable because other fishing vessels were in the 
area at the time and had previously damaged the cables, and (c) that 
the real purpose of the United States action and the press accounts 
thereof was a sheer fabrication to provoke the Soviet Union. 
Third, the most conclusive reason why the Soviet Government could 
not avoid responsibility under the 1884 Convention by claiming that 
it was signed by a predecessor government, long antedating the pres-
ent government, is that the Soviet Union has in fact adhered to the 
Convention.18 
Although not too important in our actual case because of the right 
of the United States to board and inspect the Soviet trawler under 
the 1884 Convention, the next question is worthy of serious considera-
tion: Whether the right of a state to board and inspect a foreign vessel 
exists because customary international law has developed from the 
1884 Convention and/ or from general state practice so that the right 
of the aggrieved state (and the corollary duty of the injuring state) 
would exist even though one (or both) of the states was not a party 
to the 1884 Convention~ 
Normally a treaty binds only the parties thereto under the prin-
ciple pacta tertiis nee nocent nee prosunt. Hence, third parties 
generally do not have rights (or duties) under a treaty, unless, of 
course, the treaty expressly creates rights in third parties.19 
However, it is possible for rights and duties to exist under a treaty 
for non-signatory parties thereto in at least four ways: 
(1) If the treaty codifies customary international law, it is binding 
upon non-signatory states. Of course, it might be argued that the 
norm or law which binds the non-signatory states in this instance is 
not the treaty but the customary international law apart from the 
treaty. However, the binding force of principles and rules of cus-
tomary jnternational law which have been codified is generally 
greater than in the absence of such codification. 
(2) Even though a state does not sign or ratify a treaty, it may ac-
cede to the provisions thereof later and hence be bound. 
18 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is listed as a "party" to this 
Convention in Treatie8 in Force (U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal 
Adviser, 1959), p. 250. According to Slusser and Triska, A Calendar of Soviet 
Treatie8, 1917-1957, 55 (19,591 ) "Soviet adherence" is based on a decree of 
February 2, 1926 and was implemented, concerning internal legislation, by 
decree of March 5, 1926. 
19 I Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op. cit., footnote 15 (at 925-929 (and citations 
therein)). 
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( 3) Even though a state has not ratified or acceded to a treaty, it 
1nay agree in a particular case or controversy to be bound by the ob-
ligations i1nposed on signatory states under the treaty, and, in certain 
instances, it may invoke the rights a treaty accorded to signatory 
states.20 
( 4) Finally, when a treaty is signed and ratified by a number of 
states and is operative for a long period of time, without objections by 
non-signatory states to its provisions it may come to represent cus-
tomary international law even though it was not a codification of 
customary internationalla w at the time of its adoption. 
It is the last situation above which is applicable to the question 
here. The 1884 Convention has been ratified by most of the im-
portant maritime states of the world 21 and it has been operative for 
more than 70 years. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that, 
although this Convention did not represent a codification of custom-
ary international law in 1884, in the absence of objections by non-
signatory states, a customary law has now developed which accords 
rights to, and imposes obligations upon, all states in the world 
community in line with those expressed in the Convention. 
Moreover, apart from the long history of state practice under the 
1884 Convention, the crucial need for rapid communication in this 
interdependent world is such that the right of a cable state to lay, 
operate, and maintain submarine cables (including in exceptional 
cases the right to board and inspect foreign vessels thought to have 
damaged the cables by willful or culpably negligent action) is a 
basic right of all states in the world community. 
We must now consider the question of whether the right of the 
United States to board the Soviet trawler in the present case would 
exist if both states had ratified the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 
An analysis of Articles 26 to 29, inclusive, of the 1958 Convention 
indicates that while they do not include an express provision for the 
obtaining of evidence by the injured state as is provided in Article X 
of the 1884 Convention, implying the right under unusual circum-
20 For example, the United Nations charter confer:s upon non-member states 
a number of rights. Under Article 32 non-member states have the right to 
participate in the discussion of disputes in which they are involved; under 
Article 35 they have the right to bring such disputes to the attention of the 
Security Council or the General Assembly; and under Article 50 non-member 
states have the right to consult the Security Council with respect to the solu-
tion of special economic problems arising from the application of preventive or 
enforcement measures. Jimenez de Arechaga, "Treaty Stipulations in ]..,avor 
of Third States," 50 A.J'.I.L. 338 (1956) ; 2 Hyde, International Law 1466, 
(2nd Rev. Ed., 1945). / 
21 Treaties in Force, Dept. of State 262 (1960). 
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stances such as in the present case of the cable state to board and 
inspect the foreign vessel reasonably 'thought to have caused the 
damage by willful or culpably negligent action, the right of a state 
whose cables have been damaged to obtain evidence is a necessary 
requisite to the performance of its obligations under the 1958 
Convention. 
Briefly, Articles 26 and 29 of the 1958 Convention accord the state 
certain rights (for which other states have corollary. duties). The 
former provides the express right to lay cables which, of course, 
carries with it the right to take whatever reasonable measures are 
necessary to operate and maintain the cables with due regard to the 
rights of other states to use the high seas. The latter (i.e., Art. 29) 
gives the state the right to recover the cost of lost fishing gear which 
has been sacrificed to avoid injuring a submarine cable (or pipeline). 
Articles 27 and 28 of the 1958 Convention impose certain duties 
(for which other states have corollary rights). Article 27 imposes 
the duty to legislate in. order to make damage to cables by wilful 
or culpably negligent action a punishable offense. It should be noted 
at this point that the 1958 Convention, unlike the 1884 Convention, 
does not provide for a civil action for damages in addition to the 
punishment. However, despite this omission from the 1958 Conven-
tion, the general principles of international law with respect to state 
responsibility for damage to property of nationals of foreign states 
resulting from actions which a,re willful or culpably negligent would 
accord to the injured state the right to recover for such damage. 
Article 28 imposes the duty upon a state to see that if its cable 
owners break or damage the cables of another owner (presumably 
either domestic or foreign), the injuring party shall bear the cost 
of the repairs. If this article had been broadened to include every 
person subject to the state's jurisdiction, rather than just cable owners, 
it would have been a much better provision. However, a fair inter-
pretation of Article 28 as it is worded suggests that if a cable owner 
who damages another owner's cable must pay the cost of repairs, the 
same would apply to ship owners who damage a cable. 
The main thrust of the first argument for contending that a state 
whose cables have been damaged ma.y, under unusual circumstances 
such as those of the present case, board and inspect the vessel rea-
sonably thought to be guilty of willful or culpably negligent action in 
breaking the cables is that each party to the 1958 Convention assumes 
certain duties to all other parties to take legislative action, the im-
port of which is to see that its own and other state's cables may be 
laid, operated and maintained free from damage, or with recovery 
for damage if it occurs in a willful or culpably negligent manner. 
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The determination of the identity of the possible offender and the 
'villfulness or culpability of the action requires the securing of all 
possible evidence both by the injured and the injuring states. For 
the most part this evidence will have to be gathered by the injured 
state since it is the one which will demand of the other state the 
three things which the United States demanded of the Soviet Union 
under the 1884 Convention, namely, (a.) punishment of the offending 
party, (b) reservation of the right to make claims for damages, and 
(c) a request that 'the injuring state take effective measures to prevent 
further damage. 22 
An even more compelling argument in favor of the conclusion that 
the United States would have the right under the 1958 Convention 
on the High Seas (if it were operative) to board and inspect the 
Soviet trawler under the facts of the case is that this Convention is 
a codification of international law relating to the high seas and that 
the provisions are "generally declaratory of established princi pies 
of international law." 23 Thus, in line with our previous arguments, 
since the 1884 Convention has developed into widely-practiced, cus-
tomary international law relative to the right to lay, operate and 
maintain submarine cables, the rights and duties of all states as 
enunciated in the 1884 Convention and established through more than 
70 years of state practice are codified by the 1958 Convention. 
It is vital, of course, that ships of all states sailing the high seas 
be kept free from indiscriminate boarding and inspection by a foreign 
vessel. Some feel so strongly on this point that they have contended 
that the right to board and inspect is non-existent in times o:f peace 
with the exception of cases of suspected piracy. 24 However, the 
better view is that under unusual circumstances, such as those of the 
present case, an injured state may board and inspect a foreign vessel, 
other than a foreign warship, in order to gather evidence necessary 
for the fulfillment of its obligations and as a requisite to the full 
achievement of its rights under treaties and customary international 
law.25 
22 See text, supra, p. 166. 
23 Preamble to Convention on the High Seas. See Appendix B. 
24 II Moore, Digest of International Law 892 (1906) ; I Fauchille, Traite de 
Droit International66 (1922). 
25 Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas makes provision for a warship 
of one state to board a foreign merchant ship on the high seas under "powers 
conferred by treaty," such as those implied in Article .X of the 1884 Convention. 
However, the rest of that article imposes strict limitations against boarding 
foreign merchant vessels on the high seas. Article 22 (1) provides: 
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, 
a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not 
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One final question: Does the 1884 Convention, customary interna-
tional law, or the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas give the 
right to an injured state to board a foreign war vessel, a foreign mer-
chant or fishing vessel which is publicly owned or operated, or only a 
foreign merchant or fishing vessel which is privately o·wned? 
It is clear that nothing in the 1884 Convention or in customary in-
ternationallaw gives one state the right to board and inspect a foreign 
war vessel. Moreover, under Article 8 of the Convention on the High 
Seas, 'vhich, as previously indicated, codifies established principles of 
international law, "warships on the high seas have complete immunity 
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State." 26 
Therefore, if the Soviet tra "\V ler had been a warship as defined in the 
Convention 27 it could not have been boarded and inspected by the 
United States under any circumstances. 
The real question, therefore, is whether the right to board and in-
spect a foreign vessel under circumstances such as those in this case is 
limited to privately O"\vned vessels or may be invoked even though the 
vessel is owned or operated by the state. 
The law as to the status of state-owned or operated vessels used for 
commercial purposes is not settled, although the trend in recent years 
in many states is to consider such vessels on the same basis as privately 
owned vessels. 28 
Despite considerable opposition by the Soviet bloc at the 1958 Con-
:ference, the Convention on the High Seas as finally drafted contains a 
provision which puts state-owned or operated vessels used :for commer-
cial purposes on the same basis as privately owned vessels. Article 
9 provides, 
"Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on gov-
ernment non-commercial service shall, on the high seas, have 
complete immunity :from the jurisdiction of any State other 
than the flag State." 29 
The above provision implies that i:f the state-owned or operated 
vessel is used for commercial purposes (i.e., transportation, fishing, 
justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting: 
(a) '.rhat the ship is engaged in piracy ; or 
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or 
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing the show its flag, the 
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. (See Appendix B 
for full text of the Convention on the High Seas.) 
26 Appendix B, Art. 8 ( 1). 
27 Ibid., at Art. 8 (2). 
28 Bishop, op. cit., footnote 14 (at 421). In recent treaties the United States 
has included a provision which puts state-owned vessels in the same class with 
privately -owned vessels. 
29 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 53 and corr.1 (1958). 
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etc.) it is not immune on the high seas from the jurisdiction of states 
other than the flag state. Therefore, absent any limitation on this 
provision, the United States could have boarded and inspected the So-
viet trawler under Article 9 in view of the special circumstances of 
the case. 
However, Article 9 is not :free from a lilnitation in so far as the 
Soviet Union is concerned because, in signing the Convention on the 
High Seas, she filed a reservation to this particular article, as follows: 
"The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics considers that the principle of international law accord-
ing to which a ship on the high seas is not subject to any juris-
diction except that of the flag State applies without restric-
tion to all govern1nent ships." 
Because o£ the fact that a state is generally not bound by any pro-
vision of a treaty or convention to which she files a reservation, the 
Soviet Union would appear to have some basis for protesting the 
boarding and inspection of her trawler by the United States under the 
1958 Convention on the High Seas, assuming, of course, that the Con-
vention were operative as a result of ratification by the requisite 22 
states, including the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
One possible argument for holding the boarding and inspection of 
the Soviet trawler by the United States valid under the provisions of 
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas despite the Soviet reservation to 
Article 9 would be that the general practice of states in treating pub-
licly owned or operated vessels on the sa1ne basis as privately owned 
vessels used for commercial purposes is sufficiently widespread to have 
established customary international law binding upon all states of the 
world community. Under this line of argument Article 9 of the Con-
vention would be considered as a codification of existing international 
law which would be binding upon all states regardless of any reser-
vations to this article.30 
It may be concluded with respect to the entire case that the United 
States had a right to board and inspect the Soviet trawler even though 
she may have been a publicly owned or operated vessel. 
The right of the United States existed primarily because both 
states are parties to the Convention for the Protection of Submarine 
Cables (1884). In addition, the conclusion appears justified that the 
right existed also because customary internationalla\v relative to sub-
30 This argument is worthy of serious consideration because the Convention on 
the I-Iigh Seas does not contain a provision for a state to make reservations to 
any of the articles or sections thereof whereas the Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf, adopted at the same time, does contain s~ch a provision. Art. 12 of 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. Appendix D. 
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marine cables has developed :from the 1884 Convention and from 
general state practice so that the United States could have boarded the 
trawler under the special circumstances of the case even though the 
United States and/or the Soviet Union had not been parties to the 
1884 Convention. 
Finally, there appears to be a strong basis for concluding that the 
right would exist under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas (assuming the Convention had been operative at the time of the 
incident, with both the United States and the Soviet Union as con-
tracting parties) because the 1958 Convention constitutes a codifica-
tion of international law which has become well established relative 
to laying, operating and maintaining submarine cables. 
B. PROBLEM 2: Exclusion of a Foreign Ship From Nuclear Test· 
ing Area 
FACTS: Members of the Peace Association in State A raised 
money to build and operate a small ship named The Peace Mission 
for the widely-announced purpose of navigating into State A's 
nuclear testing area on the high seas in a dramatic attempt to rally 
public opinion behind an effort on the part of scientists, religious 
leaders, and others to persuade State A to halt the tests. 
The Peace Mission, registered under the flag of State A, was 
warned not to proceed with plans to navigate into the test area during 
a designated 30-day period when the next tests were to be conducted 
by State A. All states of the world had been informed of the loca-
tion of the test area and the dates of the next tests by Notices to 
Mariners. The notices contained the following provision, among 
others: "All surface vessels of all states are prohibited from enter-
ing the test area during the test period." 
Within the test area were several islands all of which were under 
the sovereignty of State A. The tests could not be conducted on 
State A's territory because of the density of its population. 
Despite the warning, backers of The Peace Mission were adamant, 
announcing publicly that they intended to navigate into the test area. 
Shortly thereafter the Atomic Energy Commission of State A issued 
a regulation making it a crime for vessels or civilians of State A to 
enter the test area during the test period. Nothing was said in the 
regulation regarding foreign vessels. 
Although· officials of 'l'he Peace Association thought that the 
administrative regulation of the Atomic Energy Commission was 
unconstitutional, they decided to transfer the registration of The 
Peace Mission to State X, a state which had enjoyed a great increase 
179 
in ship registrations for several years because o£ "favorable" labor 
laws and low registration :fees. 
Flying the flag o£ State X, with officers and crew made up pre-
dominantly o£ citizens o£ State A, but with a few crew members from 
States X andY, The Peace Mission sailed toward the test area, af~er 
stopping :for refueling at an island under the flag o£ State A. While 
on the high seas some ditsance from the test area and just a few days 
prior to the start o£ the tests, The Peace Mission was overtaken by a 
coast guard cutter o£ State A which had pursued her :from the island 
refueling port. The Peace Mission had slipped out o£ the island port 
without getting clearance to leave, after State A's officials had re-
fused to grant her permission to depart for the purpose o£ sailing 
into the test area. 
The Peace Mission was well out to sea before her escape was 
detected. After several hours o£ pursuit the coast guard cutter o£ 
State A overtook The Peace Mission and :forced her to turn back to 
State A's island port, where she was detained until after completion 
o£ the nuclear tests and fined for having left the port without proper 
clearance. 
The government o£ State X protested to the government o£ State 
A that the action o£ the cutter was a violation o£ international law. 
The major international law questions involved in this hypothetical 
problem situation are these: 
1. Whether a state has the right to designate an area o£ the high 
seas for nuclear tests (or for missile, rocket, or other tests) during a 
limited period o£ time, and, i£ so, what responsibilities the testing 
state has to insure a minimum o£ interference with other users in the 
test area and surrounding areas o£ the high seas~ 
2. Assuming that a state has the right to designate an area o£ the 
high seas for nuclear, missile, or other tests, whether the testing state 
may merely notify other states that it is a "danger area" from which 
all other users are cautioned to stay away during the test period, or 
whether the testing state may prohibit all other users from entering 
or otherwise using the test area during the test period~ 
3. To what extent may a testing state exercise jurisdiction over a 
foreign vessel on the high seas when the flag .o£ the foreign state is 
essentially a "flag o£ convenience" without any "genuine link between 
the state and the ship" as required under Article 5 ( 1) o£ the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the I-Iigh Seas~ 31 
Q. I: Whether a state has the right to designate an area o£ the 
high seas for nuclear tests (or for missile, rocket, or other tests) dur-
ing a limited period o£ time, and, i£ so, what responsibilities the 
31 See Appendix B for full text of the Convention. 
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testing state has to insure a minimum of interference with other users 
in the test area and surrounding areas of the high seas? 
Although the legal right of a state to designate an area of the high 
seas for nuclear, missile, rocket or other tests is now widely recognized 
as a valid use of the high seas, a number of thoughtful persons oppose 
the continuation of the tests, particularly atomic and thermonuclear 
tests on the ground that they are legally and morally wrong. The 
moral arguments against such tests are (a) that the world cannot 
achieve peace if states continue to develop increasingly devastating 
weapons of destruction which are rapidly approaching the point of 
guaranteed annihilation; (b) that even though such horrible weapons 
are never used, the mere testing has an adverse genetic effect upon the 
human race because of the harmful fallout; and (c) that the sheer 
waste of human and physical resources in the entire armaments race, 
of which nuclear and missile testing is such a costly part, is In orally 
indefensible. 
The legal arguments against using any part of the high seas for 
nuclear tests were rather well summarized by Margolis in 1955 32 in 
commenting upon the hydrogen bomb tests conducted by the United 
States in a 400,000 square mile area enco1npassing a number of islands 
held under a strategic Trusteeship Agreement with the United N a-
tions. Th1argolis argued that the establishment of a vast "\varning area . 
cannot be reconciled with "the internationalla w princi pie of freedom 
of the seas and its attendant corollaries, freedom of navigation (of 
both the sea and the air), and freedom from interference with the 
lawful pursuit of maritime industries (fishing, transport, etc.)." 33 
In addition to arguing that the tests 'vere a violation of freedom of 
the seas, Margolis also claimed that they also violated both the United 
Nations Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement for the former 
32 Margolis, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and International Law," 64 Yale Law 
Journal 629 ( 1955) . 
33 Ibid., at 630, 635. Also see Margolis, "The Legality of H-Bomb Tests," The 
Nation 570 (Dec. 31, 1955) in whic.h he invokes both legal and moral arguments, 
saying, "Arguments of expediency couched in terms of defending the free world 
and human dignity become specious when placed against the clear requirements 
of the relevant rules of law and, by implication, of morality ... the laws of 
humanity suggest and the law of nations requires immediate and permanent 
cessation of the thermonuclear experiments in the vast expanse of the Marshall 
Islands proving grounds." (Ibid., at '572.) Also see the statement of Earl 
J owitt in the House of Lords: "I am entirely satisfied that the United States, in 
conducting these experiments, have taken every possible step open to them to 
avoid any possible danger. But the fact that the area which may be affected 
is so enormous at onc.e brings this problem: that ships on their lawful occasions 
may be going through these waters, and you have no right under international 
law, I presume, to warn people off." 186 H.L. Deb. 808-09 (5th Ser.1954). 
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Japanese Mandated Islands and caused an illegal pollution of the 
high seas and the air space. 
On the other hand, the legal arguments for the right of a state to 
conduct the nuclear tests have been effectively marshalled by 
McDougal and Schlei, in answer to the Margolis thesis. 34 
While the claim of a State to use a designated area of the high seas 
for nuclear weapons testing is relatively recent and unprecedented, for 
the obvious reason that science and technology did not create such 
weapons until1945, this new, emergent use of the high seas is a reason-
able one. It is reasonable because it is a necessary requisite of self-
defense. As McDougal has rightly concluded, 
"The claim of the United States is in substance a claim to 
prepare for self-defense .... It has not been possible to 
establish, under the United Nations or otherwise, either effec-
tive international control of armaments or commitments and 
procedures of global scope which offer reasonable assurance 
against aggression .... The United States has undertaken 
its program of atomic and thermonuclear weapons develop-
ment to ensure that these free nations are not lacking either 
in the retaliatory power w~ich may deter aggression or in the 
weapons of self -defense if deterrence fails. In this posture 
of world organization and crisis, which puts so high a pre-
mium on self-defense, with authorization of potentially the 
most drastic interferences with others, it cannot, we suggest, 
be reasonably concluded that it is unreasonable for the United 
States to engage in such temporary and limited interferences 
with navigation and fishing as are involved in the hydrogen 
bomb tests, in preparation for the defense of itself and its 
allies and of all the values of a free world society." 35 
Certainly the objective of defending all the values of a free world 
society is as important as, and indeed includes, the traditional uses 
of the high seas for navigation, fishing, cable laying, etc. Security is 
the keystone in the arch of all free world values and to be secure the 
United States and her allies must continue to test and perfect every 
type of defense weapon even though, it is to be hoped, these weapons 
never have to be used in defense of the Free World. 
The Soviet Government has attempted to distinguish between desig-
nating an area of the high seas for nuclear weapons testing and rocket 
or missile testing. At the 1958 Geneva Conference the Soviet bloc 
34 McDougal and Schlei, "The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful 
l\1easures for Security," 64 Yale Law Journal 648 (~955). 
35 McDougal, ''The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the 
Sea," 49 A.J.I.L. 356, 361 (1955). 
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tried desperately but without success to have inserted into the Con-
vention on the High Seas a new succinctly-worded article: "States 
are bound to refrain from testing nuclear weapons on the high seas.."36 
Yet, despite her vociferous objections to nuclear test areas on the 
high seas, the Soviet Government felt no hesitancy recently (January 
7, 1960) in designating a fairly large area of the Pacific about 1,000 
miles east of the Marshall Islands for some rocket tests, with the fol-
lowing announcement : 
"On the basis of the progress made by the Soviet Union in 
the exploration of cosmic space with the help of ballistic 
rockets, and in conformity with their research program, 
Soviet scientists and designers a.re now working to develop 
a more powerful rocket to launch heavy earth satellites and 
undertake space flights to planets of the solar system. 
"With a view to perfecting this rocket with a high accuracy 
of flight, its launchings 'vithout the last stage will be made 
within the coming months of 1960 into the central part of the 
Pacific Ocean, removed from places of intensive shipping, 
airlines and fisheries. 
"The penultimate stage of the rocket is expected to fall 
within the area with the following coordinates: 
"Latitude: 9.6 degrees north, 10.22 degrees north, 6.16 de-
grees north, 5.3 degrees north. 
"Longitude: 170.47 degrees west, 168.22 degrees west, 166.16 
degrees west, 168.40 degrees west. 
"Special ships of the Soviet fleet will be dispatched to this 
area to carry out the necessary rneasurements. 
"This first launchings of rockets will be undertaken some-
where between Jan. 15 and Feb. 15, 1960. 
"To insure the safety of navigation and air traffic during 
the launching of rockets into the Central Pacific, Tass is 
authorized to announce that the Government of the Soviet 
Union asks the governments of the nations whose ships or 
aircraft may find themselves during this period in the vicin-
ity of the area where the rockets might fall to see that the 
authorities concerned instruct the ship masters and aircraft 
36 4 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/40, 124 (1958)). The Soviet bloc was also 
unsuccessful in getting the insertion of a provision banning naval or air ranges, 
as follows: "No naval or air ranges or other combat training areas limiting 
freedom of navigation may be designated on the high seas near foreign coasts 
or on international sea routes." (Ibid.) It is rather obvious that the· main 
purpose of the Soviet bloc, with adequate land mass area in which to test nuclear 
weapons and missiles, was to cripple or eliminate similar testing by the Free 
World states who must of necessity use the high seas. 
captains to refrain from entering the aquatorium [water] 
area and airspace of the Pacific designated by the above men-
tioned coordinates." 37 
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Basically there is no distinction between designating an area of 
the high seas for atomic tests, thermonuclear tests, missile tests, 
rocket tests, or any other similar tests. In all cases the claim of 
right to use an area of the high seas for such purposes con-
stitutes the equivalent of an exclusive use of the area by the 
testing state for a limited period of time, even though the claimant 
state nevers demands an exclusive use. The reason why the designa-
tion of the area constitutes an exclusive use by the testing state is 
clear: the danger to navigation, fishing, scientific research, cable lay-
ing, and other uses of the designated area during the testing period 
is such that all states other than the State conducting the tests will, 
as a rule, stay clear of the area. 
It may be concluded that states have the right to designate limited 
areas of the high seas for the testing of atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons, missiles, rockets, etc., provided the testing program is rea-
sonable. Whether it is reasonable depends upon a number of factors, 
among which are: 
(1) There must be an actual, verifiable need to use the high seas 
as the test area. If the State has adequate land mass areas of its 
own for conducting the tests, or can enter into agreements with 
other states to use their land mass areas, the high seas which con-
stitute a common resource of all states shall not be used. 
(2) Adequate advance notice must he given to all states by the test-
ing state as to the type of tests to be conducted, the period of time 
for the tests, and an accurate designation of the test area. 
(3) The area selected must be in relatively isolated parts of the 
high seas little used for navigation, fishing, and other uses. 
(4) The size of the testing area must be kept to the absolute mini-
mum consistent with the safety of other concurrent users of the 
general area of the high seas. 
( 5) The period during which the tests are to be conducted must 
be kept as short as possible in order that interference with other 
users of the area will be minimized. 
(6) Every precaution must be taken to insure that any tests (i.e., 
atomic and thermonuclear) which may have lingering after effects 
upon the conclusion thereof should not result in substantial and con-
tinued deprivation of other uses in the test area or in surrounding 
areas. 
87 New York Times, Jan. 8, 1960, p. 2, col. 4 & 5. 
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(7) At present it appears that the testing state will be responsible 
for the payment of damages for any injury to persons or property of 
foreign states outside of the designated test area. The liability upon 
the testing state shall be absolute because of the hazardous nature of 
the testing activity; a showing of willful or negligent injury shall be 
unnecessary. 
Notwithstanding the conclusion that states have the right to desig-
nate limited areas of the high seas for the testing of weapons and 
scientific devices whenever the absence of available land mass ter-
ritory necessitates the use of such areas of the high seas, it should 
be noted that the 1958 Geneva Conference passed a resolution which 
recognized "that there is- a serious and genuine apprehension on the 
part of many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringe-
ment of the freedom of the seas," 38 and referred the matter to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations for appropriate action. 
Proposed by India, the resolution was approved in the Second Com-
mittee by a vote of 51 to one, with 14 abstentions,39 and by the plenary 
meetings by a vote of 58 to none, with 13 abstentions.40 
Members of the Soviet bloc were the principal abstainers. The rea-
son given by Tunkin of the U.S.S.R. was that his delegation believed 
that the Conference should deal with the question of nuclear tests and 
should adopt a positive rule to prohibit such tests in that they con-
stituted a violation of the principle of freedom of the high seas.41 Of 
course, Tunkin could not know in March of 1958 that in January 
of 1960 his government would take the opposite view in designating 
a large area of the high seas for rocket tests thereby effectively 
eliminating the free use of those high seas by other states during a 
specified period. 
In voting for the Indian resolution to refer the matter of nuclear 
testing to the General Assembly, and against the Soviet bloc proposal 
to add a new article which would have prohibited entirely the test-
ing of nuclear weapons on the high seas, Dean, chairman of the 
United States delegation, pointed out that his government was not 
opposed to the prohibition of nuclear tests provided it was accom-
panied by effective international control. However, he reminded the 
tenth plenary meeting that unfortunately, owing to the attitude of 
the Soviet Union Government, no agreement had so far been possible 
38 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.56 (1958). For the full text of this resolution 
entitled "Nuclear Tests on the High Seas," see Appendix F (1). 
39 4 0 jficial Records 52 ( 1958) . 
40 2 0 jficial Records 24 ( 1958) . 
41 4 0 jficial Records 53 ( 1958) . 
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and he expressed regret that the Soviet Union had boycotted the Dis-
armament Commission of the United N ations.42 
At first glance it appears that the expression in the 1958 Geneva 
Resolution of "a serious and genuine apprehension on the part of 
many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of 
the freedom of the seas," negates the conclusion we reached above that 
states do have the right to designate areas of the high seas for various 
tests, provided land mass territory is not available. However the 
resolution does not negate our conclusion. As the United Kingdom 
delegate pointed out in the Second Committee, the Indian-sponsored 
resolution to the effect that apprehension about nuclear tests was a 
fact, did not indicate how many states had such apprehensions, or 
whether they were justified.43 
Moreover, as Sen of India made abundantly clear in the Second 
Committee, his government was in favor of a complete cessation of 
all nuclear explosions, whether conducted on land or on the high 
seas, because such tests were a crime against humanity and nuclear 
energy should not be used for destruction. Finally, it is clear that 
the main purpose of the Indian-sponsored resolution was not to con-
demn nuclear testing on the high seas apart from nuclear testing on 
land, nor to place a prohibition on the continuation of such tests, as 
the Soviet bloc proposal would have done had it passed but rather 
to refer the matter to the General Assembly as the best possible way 
to resolve the entire problem of disarmament, of which nuclear testing 
on the high seas is but a part. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the record of the 1958 Geneva 
Conference affirms rather than denies the right of states to continue 
designating areas of the high seas for nuclear and other tests (a) 
provided the tests are reasonable in terms of the requirements set 
forth above and (b) until such time as the United Nations can 
devise satisfactory controls and inspection systems in connection with 
total disarmament in the world community to make unnecessary the 
continuation of large-scale weapons testing on the high seas by the 
United States and her allies in order to insure the defense of all 
the values of a free world society. 
One final point should be made. While it may be true, as someone 
once remarked, that petty consistency is the hallmark of little minds, 
it would appear to be unjustifiably inconsistent to contend, as the 
Soviet government has done, that the designation by the United States 
of an area of the high seas for nuclear weapons testing is an illegal 
violation of the freedom of the high seas, \vhereas it is valid for the 
42 2 0 [ficial Records 22-23 ( 1958) . 
43 4 0 [ficial Records 52 ( 1958) . 
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U.S.S.R. to claim the right not only to establish a rocket test area 
(see above), but also the right to conduct naval maneuvers and con-
ventional weapons testing in a designated area o:f the Arctic and 
warn vessels not to use the area during a specified period.44 
It is submitted that a state may legally designate a large warning 
area o:f the high seas :for nuclear missile, or rocket tests (assuming 
always the non-availability o:f land mass :for such tests), just as it 
may establish smaller warning areas :for conducting naval maneuvers 
and weapons testing on a relatively small scale. The ultimate test in 
every case is the reasonableness o:f the action as measured by the tests 
indicated above. 
Therefore, in the problem situation outlined, it may be concluded 
that State A had the right to establish the nuclear testing area on 
the high seas. 
Q. 2. Assuming that a state has the right to designate an area o:f 
the high seas :for nuclear, n1issile, or other tests, the next question is 
whether the testing state may merely notify other states that it is 
a "danger area" :from which all other users are cautioned to stay away 
during the test period, or whether the testing state may prohibit all 
other users from entering or otherwise using the test area during the 
test period? The question may be asked in two parts: (1) May a 
state exclude vessels o:f its own state? (2) May a state exclude vessels 
flying the flag o:f a foreign state? 
The first part o:f the over-all question posed above is a matter of 
domestic rather than international law, and hence will not be dis-
cussed here beyond saying that the United States has prevented ships 
registered under her flag from entering her nuclear test areas.45 It 
appears to us that the action o:f the United States was justified, other-
wise it would knowingly have permitted the suicide of some well-
meaning citizens who, however noble their intentions to dramatize 
the inhumanity of nuclear warfare are, fail to realize the disastrous 
consequences o:f an unprepared Free World.46 ~One purpose of a 
civilized state is to protect its citizens against their own folly, whether 
it be jumping off o:f high buildings, swallowing poison, or sailing into 
nuclear test areas. 
With respect to the second part o:f the question (i.e., the right o£ a 
testing state to exclude foreign vessels), it seems clear that all any 
state may do under present international law is to designate the test 
area as a "danger zone'' and notify all possible users thereof to stay 
44 New York Times, Sept. 3, 1957, p.1, col. 6. 
4.
5 Bigelow v. United States, 267 Fed. 2d 398 (1959), Certiorari denied, 861 
U.S. 852, 4 Law Ed. 2d 91, 80S. Ot. 113. 
46 Bigelow, The Voyage of the Golden Rule (1959) ; Reynolds', ''Forbidden 
Voyage," 187 The Nation 358 (Nov. 15, 19·58). 
187 
away during the test period. Nothing in international law or in t};le 
provisions of any of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958 confers 
upon a state the right to exclude foreign vessels from using an. ar~a 
of the high seas which has been designated ror nuclear, missile, rocket 
or other similar tests,· or even for naval maneuvers or conventional : 
weapons testing. 
This conclusion is not at variance with the conclusion reached in 
Chapter II. There it was held that the coastal state has a right under 
the 'Convention on the Continental Shelf to establish safety zone~ 
around continental shelf installations, which safety zones would then 
encompass what we designated as "protected high seas" from which 
the coastal state under certain circumstances would have not only the 
right but also the duty to exclude foreign vessels. 
But the "protected high seas" within the safety zone are different 
from the high seas of a designated test area. As indicated in Chapter 
II, the "protected high seas" of the continnetal shelf safety zone 
normally may be used by all states for navigation, fishing, scientific 
investigation, etc., subject only to the condition that such use must 
not unreasonably endanger or impede the exploitation of . the con-
tinental shelf resources. When the exploitation is unreasonable, en-
dangered or impeded, as in the problem situation posed in Chapter II, 
the coastal state may exclude the foreign vessels until such tiine as. 
the danger or impediment is removed. 
However, the "protected high seas" of the continental shelf safety 
zone differ in several important respects from an area of the high 
seas designated for nuclear or other tests, differences which make it 
unreasonable to conclude that a testing state may prohibit foreign 
vessels from entering the test area. 
First, by formulating the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 
the world community of states has sanctioned the creation of a safety 
zone by a coastal state around continental shelf installations and in 
doing so has given a special character to the high seas within the 
zone. The world community has also conferred certain express rights 
(and imposed certain duties) upon the coastal state with respect to 
controlling those "protected high seas" in connection with the exploi-
tation of the continental shelf resources. The rights conferred in-
clude the right to prohibit vessels from using the "protected high 
seas" of the safety zone under certain extreme conditions. 
By contrast, in designating a nuclear or other test area in the high 
seas, no state has been so bold as to claim the right to prohibit foreign 
vessels or aircraft from using such areas.47 Nor does an international 
47 MacChesney, U.S. Naval War College Internq,tional Law Situation and 
Documents-1956 611-629 (1957). It is true that the United States did desig-
nate some closed areas to all vessels and aircraft as of Jan. 7, 1956, but this 
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convention exist which even suggests that a state has the right to ex-
clude foreign vessels from any area of the high seas (other than from 
the continental shelf safety zone). On the contrary, the Convention 
on the High Seas contains the express provision that "the high seas 
being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any 
part of them to its sovereignty." 48 
Second, the area of the "protected high seas" of the continental 
shelf safety zone under present contemplation is a: relatievly small 
area of the high seas as compared with the vast areas required for 
nuclear and other tests. The Convention on the Continental Shelf 
expressly limits the safety zone to a "distance of 500 metres around 
the installations and other devices which have been erected," with the 
specific requirement that "ships of all nationalities must respect these 
safety zones." 49 
By contrast, the areas of the high seas designated by testing states 
for nuclear or other tests_ may be, and usually are, large. The United 
States test area for the hydrogen bomb tests covered 400,000 square 
miles. The area recently designated by the Soviet Government for 
rocket tests, although smaller than the United States thermonuclear 
test area, was vast as compared with the contemplated safety zone 
areas encompassing "protected high seas" around continental shelf 
installations. 
Both the limitation of the safety zone to a small area, and partic-
ularly the right which is accorded the coastal state under the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf to demand the respect of its safety 
zone by foreign vessels give rise to the right to exclude such vessels 
fron1 the safety zone if necessary. Stated another way, the right to 
included the land areas of certain a tolls and the three-mile territorial sea 
thereof. (Ibid., at 627.) However, in areas of the high seas the United States 
has only esta.blished "danger areas." Similarly, the Soviet Government in its 
recent designation of the area of the high seas for her rocket tests made no 
attempt to exclude other users from the area, but only warned vessels and 
aircraft. (For the text of the Soviet announcement see, supra, p. 182.) 
48 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53 and corr. 1, Art. 2 (1958). Admittedly this 
statement in Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas is stronger than is 
justified and less accurate than it should be, in view of (a) state practice, (b) 
other provisions of the four Geneva Conventions of 1958. For example, the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf gives the coastal state the right to build 
and maintain installations on the contintenal shelf which installations do 
constitute an exercise of sovereignty over a part of the high seas (i.e., the high 
seas occupied by the installations). Also, as pointed out previously, while a 
state may not purport to subject the high seas designated as a test area to its 
sovereignty, the effect is equivalent to an emclusive use (i.e., sovereignty) for 
a limited period of time because in most cases other users will stay away because 
of the danger. 
49 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art. 5(3). See Appendix D. 
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exclude foreign vessels from the "protected high seas" of a small 
safety zone is justified not only because of the provisions of the Con-
vention but also because of the fact that such exclusion in a few 
unusual cases would not greatly burden the excluded state. 
On the other hand, in view of (a) the long history of the struggle 
for more than three centuries to protect the freedom of the high seas, 
and (b) the provision of the Convention on the High Seas which 
denies the right of a state to subject any part of them to its sover-
eignty 50 (unless as expressly provided in any of the Conven-
tions-e.g., the continental shelf safety zones), it w o u 1 d be 
unreasonable to conclude that a state has the right to exclude foreign 
vessels from any area of the high seas without world community 
sanction, particularly from so large an area of the high seas as the 
test areas. 
Third, one notes a decided difference in the possible need for a 
coastal state to exclude foreign vessels from the "protected high seas" 
of the safety zone around the continental shelf installations, as con-
trasted with the lack of any such possible need in a designated test 
area. Presently most of the continental shelf installations are per-
manent or semi-permanent. This being the case they cannot be moved 
readily to accommodate other users (i.e., those who wish to navigate, 
fish, conduct scientific research, lay cables, etc.). Hence, the coastal 
state must have the ultimate right to exclude other users from the 
safety zone whenever necessary in order to protect these installations 
and devices used in the exploitation of the natural resources. 
By contrast, a state designating an area of the high seas for con-
ducting nuclear or other tests does not need the right to exclude 
foreign vessels from the designated area in order to perform the 
tests. To be sure, if foreign vessels are not excluded from a test area 
they may suffer damage, but it is enough to warn them of the danger 
and then leave it to them to decide whether they wish to heed the 
warning or assume the risk of damage by entering the test area. 
Therefore, since the need to exclude foreign vessels from the "pro-
tected high seas" of a safety zone may exist, and since there is no 
need to exclude such vessels from a designated test area in the high 
seas, the two types of high seas differ significantly, justifying the 
right of exclusion in certain unusual instances in the case of the safety 
zone, but not justifying it in the case of the designated test area. 
Finally, the "protected high seas" of the safety zone differs mark-
edly from the designated test area of the high seas in that in the 
former all states have a normal expectation of continuing use of the 
high seas around the continental shelf installations for navigation, 
50 See Appendix B. 
190 
fishing, and other uses while the coastal state is exploiting the conti-
nental shelf resources, whereas in the case of the designated test area 
there is no normal expectation of use during the test period because 
of the nature of the testing activity and, in fact, little use of the test 
area at any tin1e because of its isolated location. vVhile continental 
shelf installations may not be located in such a way as to interfere 
with the use of "recognized sea lanes essential to international naviga-
tion," 51 they may be located near such sea lanes and a:lso in areas of 
the high seas which may be excellent fishing grounds where fishing 
would be conducted on a large scale by coastal and overseas fleets 
concurrently with the exploitation of oil or other resources from the 
continental shelf by the. coastal state. 
·, On the other hand, one of the tests o£ the reasonableness of the desig-
nation of a test area by a state is that the area selected must be in an 
isolated section of the high seas little used for navigation, fishing and 
other purposes. The hasty conclusion which might be drawn relative 
to this difference in expectation of use of the "protected high seas" 
of the continental shelf safety zone as contrasted with the use of the 
isolated test area of the high seas is that the former (i.e., safety zone) 
should not permit of exclusion of foreign vessels because of the 
possible serious burden to other users, whereas the latter test area could 
permit of exclusion without serious impairment of other uses because 
of little expectation of use of the isolated test areas. Yet, a more 
refiecti ve consideration of the total problem, viewed from the per-
spective of the arguments n1arshalled above, particularly those based 
upon the provision of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas which 
codifies "the rules of international law relating to the high seas" 52 
in denying the right of any State to exercise sovereignty over any part 
of the high seas (except, of course, where other conventions ma,y 
accord special rights such as in the case of the continental shelf safety 
zones), leads inexorably to the conclusion that testing states may not 
prohibit other states from using the vast test a.reas. 
To permit the exclusion of foreign vessels from test areas could 
conceivably lead to spurious claims by states to large areas of the 
high seas, ostensibly for conducting nuclear, missile, rocket, or other 
tests, when in fact the claims would be £or ulterior purposes inimical 
to the best interests of the total values of the free world society. 
Therefore, the basic, overriding princi pie of freedom of the high 
seas must prevail not only in all conventions which are written, 
but in the decisions which are made in various foreign offices and in 
the World Court and other international tribunals. The right of 
51 Art. 5(6). See Appendix D. 
52 Preamble to Convention on the High Seas. See Appendix B. 
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one state to exclude another from any area of the high seas, even 
for a limited time, must not be permitted, unless expressly authorized 
by an international convention (e.g., the Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf) and only then in extreme circumstances such as those 
formulated in the problem situation in Chapter II where in imminent 
danger to the continental shelf installations justified the neutral 
coastal state in excluding from the "protected high seas" of the safety 
zone the warships of belligerents. 
Therefore, it :follows that State A could not exclude a foreign 
vessel from its nuclear testing area, although presumably it would not 
be liable for any damage suffered by the vessel or its personnel inside 
the test area on the theory that the foreign vessel, having been 
warned of the danger, assumed the risks of navigating into the 
area. 
But here there is a real question as to 'vhether the vessel, The 
Peace Mission, is in fact a foreign vessel. It is manned by officers 
and crew who were predominantly citizens of State A, and its flag 
was changed to State X largely for convenience in order to a void 
the possible application of the administrative regulation of the Atomic 
Energy Commission which made entrance into a test area for vessels 
of State A a punishable offense. This leads to the next question. 
Q. 3. To what extent may a testing state exercise jurisdiction over 
a foreign vessel on the high seas when the flag of the vessel is essen-
tially a "flag of convenience" with some doubt as to the "genuine link 
between the state and the ship'' as required under Article 5 ( 1) of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas~ 
Article 5 ( 1) provides as follows : 
"Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its na-
tionality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, 
and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality 
of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must 
exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in par-
ticular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters over 
ships flying its flag." 53 (emphasis added) 
The International Law Commission had the same provision in its 
final draft articles.54 Just what constitutes a "genuine link" is no-
where defined by the Commission, nor did the 1958 Conference decide 
upon any tests for determining the matter. In its commentaries on the 
article, the Commission admitted that the terminology was vague and 
lacked precision, saying, 
53 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr.1 (1958). 
54 U.N. Doc. A/3159, 24, Art. 29 (1956). 
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"The Commission does not consider it possible to state in any 
greater detail what form this link should take. This lack of 
precision made some members of the Commission question the 
advisability of inserting such a stipulation. But the ma-
jority of the Commission preferred a vague criterion to no 
criterion at all. While leaving States a wide latitude in this 
respect, the Commission wished to make it clear that the 
grant of its flag to a ship cannot be a mere administrative for-
mality, with no accompanying guarantee that the ship pos-
sesses a real link with its new State." 55 
At the 1958 Conference the United States and several other states, 
particularly Liberia and Panama, currently ranking third and sixth, 
respectively, in merchant fleet tonnage in the world,56 opposed the 
"genuine link" provision. The Liberian delegate argued that the 
provision would lead to confusion, 57 and the Panamanian delegate not 
only criticized the lack of precision of the language but also contended 
that its use would encourage States to interfere in the internal affairs 
of others. 58 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom delegate said that the 
article was acceptable as a statement of principle and that no attempt 
should be made to define the "genuine link" in greater detail and that, 
in any event, the job of definition was a specialized task for another 
body with more time and greater knowledge of the issues.59 Other 
states concurred and the article was adopted. 
Under the facts of our hypothetical problem it could be argued that 
there is no "genuine link between the state and the ship." The rea-
son The Peace Association changed the registration was stipulated 
to be for the purpose of a voiding the application of the regulation 
of the Atomic Energy Commission of State A. Moreover, the ma-
jority of the officers and crew of the vessel are citizens of State A. 
Finally, The Peace Association which raised the money to build the 
vessel for the specific purpose of sailing into the nuclear test area 
is an association of State A. 
Under the above analysis the facts seem to indicate a lack of any 
"genuine link" (whatever its exact tests) between the ship and State 
X, · which brings into play another article of the Convention on the 
High Seas under which the coast guard vessel of State A would 
have the right to exercise jurisdiction over The Peace Mission even 
55 Ibid., at 25. 
M Merchant Fleets of the World (as of Dec. 31, 1958) U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Maritime Administration. 
67 4 Official Records (A/CONF. 13/40, 63 (1958)). 
58 Ibid-., at 62. 
69 Ibid. 
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though she was flying the flag of State X . Article 22 ( 1) of that 
Convention provides in part, 
"1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers 
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign 
merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding 
her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting : . . . 
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show 
its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the 
warship." 60 
On the other hand, it could be argued that ownership of the vessel 
and nationality of the crew are not elements of a "genuine link," 
since proposals to take these into account were rejected by the Con-
ference. The only requisite of Article 5 ( 1) cited above is that "the 
state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in admin-
istrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag." 61 
Since there is no evidence that State X did not exercise jurisdiction 
and control over the vessel, The Peace Mission, the more valid con-
elusion is that the testing state, State A, had no right to exercise 
jurisdiction over the vessel on the high seas. 
60 Appendix B, p. 203. 
61 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and corr. 1 (1958). 
